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TITLE IV-FALSE DECLARATIONS
I. PROVISIONS
Title IV was designed to facilitate the bringing of federal per-
jury prosecutions,1 thereby strengthening the deterrent value of
the perjury penalties and acting as a greater incentive for truthful
testimony.2 It establishes a new false declarations statute appli-
cable to court and grand jury proceedings, 3 with maximum penal-
ty slightly increased over that allowable under the previously
controlling perjury statute. 4
The rigorous common law requirements of proof necessary for
a finding of falsity-the two witness rule and the direct evidence
rule-have been made inapplicable to prosecutions under this
section,5 as they were thought to inhibit perjury prosecutions.
Only proof that the statement was false beyond a reasonable
doubt is required to sustain a false declarations conviction.6 In
addition, irreconcilably contradictory declarations may be alleged
as evidence of a false declaration without imposing a burden upon
the Government to prove which statement is false. 7 However, a
defendant's belief that each statement was true at the time it was
made will serve as a defense. 8 The statute also contains a recanta-
tion provision modeled on New York law9 that will allow a
witness to retract a false statement without subjecting himself to
perjury prosecution. 10 Prosecution under this section will be bar-
1 H.R. REP. No. 91-1541, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT]. The offense created by this section makes it a crime to knowingly make a false
material declaration, or make or use any other information knowing it to contain a false
material declaration, while under oath in a proceeding before or ancillary to a court or
grand jury of the United States. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623(a) (Supp. 197 1).
2 S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT]. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201-02 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
3 SENATE REPORT 33; HOUSE REPORT 33.
4 The previously controlling general perjury statute (18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964)) which is
still in effect, provides for a maximum imprisonment of five years and/or a maximum fine
of two thousand dollars. The newly created false declarations statute (18 U.S.C.A. § 1623
(Supp. 1971)) retains the same maximum term of imprisonment but increases the max-
imum fine to ten thousand dollars. However, the latter penalty is identical to that under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1964), relating to false statements within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States (statements not required to be given under oath).
5 See HOUSE REPORT 33; SENATE REPORT 33.
6 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623(e) (Supp. 1971).
7 Id. § 1623(c).
8 Id.
9 SENATE REPORT 150. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1967).
10 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623(d) (Supp. 1971).
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red if the witness admits the falsity of a declaration previously
made in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding, if at
the time of the admission, the declaration has not substantially
affected the proceeding, or it has not yet become apparent that its
falsity will be exposed.11
The general perjury statute that has previously defined the
offense pertaining to a court or grand jury12 has not been repealed,
however, and will exist concurrently with the newly created sec-
tion. Fear was expressed in the House Hearings that allowing
these two statutes to coexist might result in perjury being consid-
ered a lesser included offense in a false declarations charge. Since
perjury still requires proof according to the rigorous common law
rules, concern was expressed that an offense carrying a lesser
punishment might require a higher burden of proof.'3 Further
discussion resolved this issue to the contrary and clarified that the
previous perjury section would apply only to those proceedings
not covered by the new false declaration section.
14
II. ABOLITION OF COMMON LAW RULES OF PROOF
Still, even if the two statutes do not overlap, there does not
appear to be any rational basis set forth for abolishing the special-
ized common law rules of proof for perjury before a court or
grand jury, while retaining those rules for perjury committed
before any other competent tribunal. As it has been applied in
American practice, the "two-witness" rule states that in perjury
prosecutions, "the uncorroborated oath of one witness is not
enough to establish the falsity of the testimony of the ac-
cused ... ,"15 The corollary to this rule, the direct evidence rule,
requires that "there must be direct and positive evidence of the
statement under oath, and the circumstantial evidence of such
falsity, no matter how persuasive, [is] insufficient."' 16 The purpose
11 1d.; HOUSE REPORT 47.
12 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964).
13 Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 555 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings] (statement of the Section of Criminal Law of the A BA regarding S. 30).
14 House Hearings 637. Section 1621 contains the language "except as otherwise
expressly provided by law .... The recognition of other such statutes is further eluci-
dated in the Reviser's Note, following 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (1966).
15 Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 626 (1926) (prosecution for subordination of
perjury in a bankruptcy proceeding); see also United States v. Edmondson, 410 F.2d 670,
674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 966 (1969); Gebhard v. United States, 422 F.2d 281,
286 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Brandyberry, No. 25,474 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1971)
(perjurous testimony before a grand jury).
16 Radomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1950); Vuckson v.
United States, 354 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 991 (1966); United
States v. Brandyberry, No. 25,474 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1971). But see United States v.
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served by these rules has been clearly enunciated in Weiler v.
United States,17 where the Court upheld the continued vitality of
the two-witness rule after attacks on its current relevance and its
hindrance to perjury prosecutions:
Lawsuits frequently engender in defeated litigants sharp re-
sentments and hostilities against adverse witnesses ... rules
of law must be so fashioned as to protect honest witnesses
from hasty and spiteful retaliation in the form of unfounded
perjury prosecutions.
... Since equally honest witnesses may well have differing
recollections of the same event, we cannot reject as wholly
unreasonable the notion that a conviction for perjury ought
not to rest entirely upon an 'oath against an oath.' The rule
may originally have stemmed from quite different reasoning,
but implicit in its evolution and continued vitality has been
the fear that innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or
convicted in perjury prosecutions if a less stringent rule were
adopted.18
In the enactment of a new false declarations provision, Con-
gress has rejected the concern of the court in Weiler,19.and with it
the "rigid common law rules of evidence" 20 that have hindered
successful, perjury prosecutions. 21 Congress has rejected these
rules, however, only in false declaration prosecutions before court
or grand jury proceedings 22 and has failed to conform the existing
proof requirements applicable in other perjury situations to its
new legislative finding.
23
By allowing a prosecution to be based on contradictory state-
Collins, 272 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1960) (test should
not be whether evidence is direct, but whether it is of quality to assure that a guilty verdict
is solidly founded).
17 323 U.S. 606 (1945).
18 Id. at 609.
19 See SENATE REPORT 149- 50.
20 SENATE REPORT 59.
21 Cf. These rules have also been criticized by Professor Wigmore. 7 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2040-43 (3d ed. 1940).
22 Cf. In false statement prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, (see note 4 supra) courts
have held the two-witness and direct evidence rules inapplicable. Stein v. United States,
363 F.2d 587, 589 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); United States v.
Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653, 665 (2d Cir. 1965); Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724,
744-45 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964). But see Gold v. United States,
237 F.2d 764, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Bazelon, dissenting) (lower court was affirmed by an
equally divided court en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 985 (1957).
23 THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL
REPORT: A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE)
(1971), has recognized a need for uniformity in its proposed perjury statute. It sets forth, in
the alternative, both the corroboration requirements of § 162 1, and the proof requirement
of the newly enacted § 1623. See proposed § 1351(2), id. 128. There is substantial support
in the Commission for the view that a special corroboration requirement for perjury is
outmoded. See Comment after Proposed § 1351, id. 129.
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ments without requiring the Government to prove which state-
ment is false, this provision has also departed from previous law.
Under the general perjury statute a prosecution cannot be based
on inconsistent statemeits alone without proof of which state-
ment is false.24 Thus, an indictment is sufficient under this new
section if it sets forth, without specifying which is false, two or
more declarations which are inconsistent to the degree that one is
necessarily false. Furthermore, each declaration must have been
knowingly made under oath, material to the point in question, and
within the period of the statute of limitations.2 5 The last require-
ment was designed to prevent a defendant from being indirectly
punished for a false statement with which he otherwise could not
have been charged, because of the running of the statute of
limitations.26 The fact that the defendant believed each statement
to be true at the time each declaration was made will be an
affirmative defense to an indictment under this subsection.2 7 The
falsity of a declaration may be established by proving that the
defendant, while under oath made irreconcilably contradictory
declarations material to the point in question in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury.
28
It is important to note that the above discussion of the common
law rules of proof-the two-witness, direct evidence and incon-
sistent statement rules-is relevant only to the proof of the ele-
ment of falsity. For a successful perjury prosecution under this
statute, knowledge, falsity and materiality are each distinct ele-
ments that must be proved, whether the prosecution is based on a
single false statement or contradictory statements. 29 Clarifying the
element of knowledge has been the subject of much of the dis-
cussion on title IV in the House Hearings.3 0 The Bar Association
of the City of New York suggested that willfulness be more
clearly established as an element, especially where falsity is estab-
lished by inconsistent statements. 3' The Senate version was also
criticized by the American Bar Association as being ambiguous as
24See, e.g., United States v. Nessanbaum, 205 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1953); McWhorter
v. United States, 193 F.2d 982, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1952).
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623 (c) (Supp. 197 1). The statute of limitations provision was derived
from a New York statute. House Hearings 673 (letter from Dep't of Justice). See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 210.20 (McKinney 1967).
26 HOUSE REPORT 47.
27 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623 (c) (Supp. 1971); HousE REPORT 47.
28 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623(c) (Supp. 1971).
2 HOUSE REPORT 47.
3
0 See, e.g., House Hearings 310 (statement of ABCNY); id. 585-86 (discussion with
Edward L. Wright & Samule Dash of the ABA); id. 635-37 (letter from Dep't of Justice).
"1 House Hearings 311.
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to whether an intent to deceive must be shown. 32 The ABA
recommended that language from the Model Act on Perjury33 be
adopted to clarify this intent.34 The specific language of the Model
Act was not adopted, however, although clarifying amendments
were made regarding the element of knowledge.35
32 Id. 542 (statement of Edward L. Wright, President-Elect of the ABA); See also
House Hearings 585- 86.
" The Model Act was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. It is reprinted with comments in House Hearings 579-85.
34 See note 32 supra.
35 Compare proposed § 1623, reprinted in SENATE REPORT 12, and Commentary at
149- 50, with § 1623 as enacted, and Commentary, HOUSE REPORT 47.
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